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ABSENT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, WARRANTLESS FELONY ARREST
EFFECTED IN SUSPECT'S HOME VIOLATES FOURTH AMENDMENT
GUARANTEES
United States v. Reed
The fourth amendment guarantees to citizens the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures of their persons and
property.' It is well settled that searches are unreasonable per se
when conducted without a warrant in the absence of exigent circum-
stances.' In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that a warrantless
arrest in a public place does not violate the fourth amendment 3
when based on probable cause.4 Whether the same rule applies to
The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and
seizure provides the standard for the courts to evaluate law enforcement practices. See, e.g.,
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrests effected in public places
reasonable); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (detainment unreasonable absent judicial
determination as to probable cause); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (war-
rantless search not unreasonable if evidence seized in plain view); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967) (warrantless wiretapping of phone booth unreasonable); Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967) (warrantless entry and search not unreasonable when in hot pursuit).
I See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 358 (1977); United States
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486-87 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958). In Trupiano
v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 703-06 (1948), the Supreme Court established the categorical
rule that the fourth amendment is violated when the police conduct a warrantless search
although a warrant could have been obtained. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1950), however, the Court overruled Trupiano, stating that the reasonableness of official
conduct under the fourth amendment should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 66.
Nineteen years later, in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court articulated the
search incident to arrest doctrine, see note 36 infra, and expressly overruled the Rabinowitz
principle. 395 U.S. at 768. The Chimel Court stated that "although '[tihe recurring ques-
tions of the reasonableness of searches' depend upon the facts and circumstances-the total
atmosphere of the case,' those facts and circumstances must be viewed in the light of estab-
lished Fourth Amendment principles." Id. at 765 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. at 63, 66 (citation omitted)).
I United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson, the Court reaffirmed the
common law rule permitting warrantless felony arrests where the officer either witnessed the
offense or had reasonable grounds for believing that an offense had been committed. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156-57 (1925); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 504
(1885); E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST § 57 (1967). See generally C. BERRY, ARREST, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 14(a) (1973); Comment, Watson and Ramey: The Balance of Interest In Non-
Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 838, 844-46 (1976).
Under the fourth amendment, arrests made with or without a warrant must be based
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arrests effected in the home, however, has not yet been addressed
by the Court.5 Faced with this question in United States v. Reed,I
the Second Circuit recently held that a warrantless felony arrest
effected in a suspect's home is prohibited by the fourth amendment,
regardless of the existence of probable cause and statutory author-
ity, if made in the absence of exigent circumstances.7
on probable cause. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). An arrest warrant is valid only if
issued after a determination of probable cause has been made by a neutral and detached
magistrate. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-51 (1971); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
The magistrate's inquiry should focus on whether the facts establish a reasonable basis for
believing that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. See
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,485 (1958). See also, Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S.
560, 564-65 (1971); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 101-02 (1959).
5 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 45 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6, 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring), 433 (Stewart,
J., concurring) (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 n.13 (1975); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 480-81 (1971). See also United States v. Berenguer, 562 F.2d 206,
210 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 235 (8th Cir.) (Heaney, J., dissent-
ing) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 388-89 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (en banc). Over 20 years ago, the Supreme Court noted that warrantless arrests in
the home present a difficult question under the fourth amendment. Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493 (1958). In Jones, federal agents arrested the defendant by means of a forcible
nightime entry, although they had obtained only a daytime search warrant. Id. at 494-95. The
Supreme Court held that the entry was unauthorized under the terms of the warrant and
ordered the seized evidence suppressed. Id. at 497, 500. Rejecting the government's argument
that, even in the absence of a valid search warrant, the entry was justified because the agents'
purpose was to arrest the defendant, the Court stated:
These contentions, if open to the Government here, would confront us with a
grave constitutional question, namely, whether the forceful nightime entry into a
dwelling to arrest a person reasonably believed within, upon probable cause that
he had committed a felony, under circumstances where no reason appears why an
arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment.
Id. at 499-500. Despite the language in Jones, the issue of warrantless home arrests, until
recently, had received little attention. In fact, many have assumed that such entries are an
integral part of the police power to arrest. See Haddad, Arrest, Search and Seizure: Six
Unexamined Issues in Illinois Law, 26 DE PAUL L. REv. 492, 515-16 (1977); Recent Develop-
ment, Warrantless Arrest by Police Survive a Constitutional Challenge-United States v.
Watson, 14 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 193, 207-14 (1976). See also note 27 infra. The Supreme Court,
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475-76 (1971), noted that fourth amendment
litigation in this area has tended to focus on issues such as the existence of probable cause
and whether a search made subsequent to an arrest exceeded permissible bounds. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 80 (2d
Cir. 1973). The Coolidge Court also suggested that, in focusing on the issues of probable cause
and the propriety of searches, the courts have been diverted from "the more fundamental
question of when the police may arrest a man in his house without a warrant." 403 U.S. at
476.
, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978).
7 Id. at 418.
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In Reed, an undercover agent from the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) purchased heroin from Nancy Reed and Morris
Goldsmith on three separate occasions.8 Several months after the
last sale, DEA agents proceeded without a warrant to Reed's apart-
ment for the purpose of arresting Reed and Goldsmith.' After enter-
ing the apartment without force,10 the agents found and seized ad-
dress books that belonged to Reed and appeared to contain the
names and telephone numbers of known drug dealers." At trial,
Reed moved to suppress the admission of the books into evidence,
contending that the agents' entry without an arrest warrant was
unlawful.1 2 The district court denied her motion on the ground that
the DEA agents had statutory authority to make warrantless felony
arrests based on probable cause.1 3 Both defendants subsequently
were convicted on two counts of distributing heroin."
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted the Supreme Court's re-
luctance to determine the constitutionality of warrantless arrests
effected in the home and attempted to discern the proper rule from
cases in which the Court considered other fourth amendment is-
8 Id. at 414-15.
,Id.
10 The circumstances surrounding the entry and arrest were disputed at trial. The defen-
dants claimed that the agents entered with exposed weapons after the apartment door was
opened. Id. at 415. Reed also testified that, upon entering, the agents immediately rushed
into the bedroom where they found and arrested Goldsmith. Goldsmith claimed that the
agents' weapons were drawn during the arrest. Id. at 415-16. The agents, in contrast, testified
that their weapons were not drawn and that they had proceeded peaceably in their search
for Goldsmith. Id. The Reed court did not appear to find the discrepancy significant. See note
20 infra.
" 572 F.2d at 415-16. One of the agents testified that he noticed an address book lying
open on a telephone table in the living room-dining room and that he seized it along with
two others after recognizing the alias of a known narcotics dealer. Id. at 416. Reed, however,
testified that the agent removed one book from a kitchen drawer and one from her pocket-
book. Id. The court did not attempt to reconcile the conflicting statements.
'1 Id. at 417 n.2.
'3 Id. at 414, 417 n.2. The DEA agents were empowered to make a warrantless arrest
under § 508 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control act of 1970, 21 U.S.C.
§ 878 (1976), and the defendants did not contest the existence of probable cause. 572 F.2d at
418 n.4.
Reed did not make a suppression motion prior to trial in accordance with FED. R. CRim.
P. 12(b) (1975). Nevertheless, the district court found that the objection was not barred under
Rule 12(f), since the prosecuting attorney had agreed to an exchange of evidence but failed
to give Reed prior notice of his intention to use the address book at trial. 572 F.2d at 417 n.2;
see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(d), 16. Thus, although the lower court ruled against Reed's suppres-
sion motion, the issue of the legality of the arrest was preserved for appeal. 572 F.2d at 417
n.2.
" 572 F.2d at 414; see Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
99 202, 401(a)(1), 401(b)(1)(A)-(B), 406, 21 U.S.C. § 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)-(B), 846
(1976).
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sues.'- Writing for a unanimous Second Circuit panel,'6 Judge Mes-
kill distinguished an arrest effected in a public place from an arrest
made in the home.17 Emphasizing the reasonable expectation of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment, he observed that the
personal intrusion necessarily accompanying an arrest is signifi-
cantly magnified when coupled with an incursion on the "sanctity
of the home."'' Thus, the Reed court concluded, in light of the
substantial invasion of privacy involved, warrantless felony arrests
conducted in the home are impermissible in the absence of exigent
circumstances.' 9 Since Reed was inside her home at the time of her
arrest2 and there was no apparent justification for the agents' fail-
" 572 F.2d at 417-20; see note 5 supra. The Reed court noted that, although the issue
has not been definitively resolved, "the [Supreme] Court has offered important signals as
to how it ought to be handled." 572 F.2d at 418. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 477-78 (1971), for example, the Court stated that its decision in Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967), which established the "hot pursuit" justification for warrantless entry to
arrest, "certainly stands by negative implication for the proposition that an arrest warrant is
required in the absence of exigent circumstances." 403 U.S. at 480-81. Moreover, the Reed
court noted, in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976), the Supreme Court indi-
cated a clear judicial preference for the securing of arrest warrants whenever possible. 572
F.2d at 419 (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427-29 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). See also 572 F.2d at 422 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565
(1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
114 (1975); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958); McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14 (1948)).
," The Reed panel was comprised of Circuit Judges Meskill and Feinberg and Judge
Bartels of the Eastern District of New York, who sat by designation.
,T 572 F.2d at 422.
,Id. at 423. Conceding that the exacting rules governing warrantless searches are not
applicable in the area of warrantless public arrests, Judge Meskill nevertheless concluded
that the rule governing public arrests does not afford sufficient protection when the arrest is
made "in an intrinsically private place." Id. at 422. In support of this position, the court cited
a number of cases indicating that the fourth amendment provides the greatest degree of
protection when the search and seizure involves a private dwelling. Id. (citing United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v.
Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975)).
" 572 F.2d at 418, 423.
Id. at 422-23. The Second Circuit attached little significance to the question whether
Reed was arrested at the door to her apartment, as the district court found, or in her living
room-dining room, as Reed contended since, at the time of her arrest, she was not in a public
area of the apartment bulding or" 'as exposed to public view, speech, hearing, and touch as
if she had been standing completely outside her house.' "Id. at 423 (quoting United States
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976)). In addition, the court stated that it would have been
extremely difficult for the government to prove that Reed consented to a search or arrest.
Although no such argument was advanced, the court noted:
19791
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ure to secure a warrant,2' the court ruled that the seized evidence
should have been suppressed and reversed Reed's conviction.22
The Reed holding, it is submitted, represents a salutary expan-
sion of the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable inva-
sions of the right of privacy.23 When the government seeks to intrude
We do not believe that the fact that Reed opened the door to her apartment in
response to the knock of three armed federal agents operated in such a way as to
eradicate her Fourth Amendment privacy interests. To hold otherwise would be to
present occupants with an unfair dilemma, to say the least-either open the door
and thereby forfeit cherished privacy interests or refuse to open the door and
thereby run the risk of creating the appearance of an "exigency" sufficient to justify
a forcible entry. This would hardly seem fair in situations that present no exigent
circumstances in the first place.
572 F.2d at 423 n.9 (citations ommitted).
21 To measure the existence of exigency, the Second Circuit utilized a test devised by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(en banc). The Dorman test requires:
First, that a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of viol-
ence ...
Second, and obviously inter-related, that the suspect is reasonably believed to
be armed . ..
Third, that there exists not merely the minimum of probable cause, that is
requisite even when a warrant has been issued, but beyond that a clear showing of
probable cause, including "reasonably trustworthy information," to believe that
the suspect committed the crime involved.
Fourth, strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being
entered.
Fifth, a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended.
Sixth, the circumstance that the entry, though not consented, is made peace-
ably.
Id. at 392-93 (footnotes omitted). The Dorman court also stated that the reasonableness of a
warrantless intrusion must be examined more critically in cases involving a nighttime entry
made for the purpose of arrest. Id. at 393. Applying the Dorman criteria to the facts in Reed,
the Second Circuit concluded that the warrantless arrest could not be justified on the grounds
of exigency. 572 F.2d at 424-25.
22 572 F.2d at 425, 427. Since the agents' entry was unlawful, the phone books that were
seized as evidence in "plain view" were held inadmissible. Id. at 425. The court rejected the
government's argument that use of the books was "harmless" error, noting that they were
used at trial to counter Reed's defense of entrapment. Id. Judge Meskill refused to reverse
defendant Goldsmith's conviction, however, since Goldsmith failed to raise the issue of the
legality of his arrest at trial. Moreover, the court noted that Goldsmith "specifically
declin[ed] on a number of occasions to associate himself with Reed's efforts to gain suppres-
sion of the books." Id. at 417 n.2.
2 The purpose of the fourth amendment is to guard against unreasonable intrusions by
the government into a person's expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 445-48 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1975); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 510-15 (1971) (White, J., concurring and dissenting); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 350-52 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312-13, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958); McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451, 453, 456 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). In Santana,
the Supreme Court held that the warrantless public arrest rule, see note 3 and accompanying
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upon the sanctity of the home, the need for a detached magistrate
to determine whether probable cause exists is underscored and the
standard for evaluating what is reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment should become more exacting.24 While these principles were
developed primarily in the area of government searches,2 they
would appear to be equally applicable when the invasion is for the
purpose of effecting an in-home arrest.28
Proponents of a rule permitting police to arrest a suspect in his
home without a warrant often point out that the courts traditionally
have treated searches and arrests as analytically distinct issues.Y In
text supra, is applicable when the suspect is arrested while standing in the open doorway of
his home. 427 U.S. at 42. The Santana Court reasoned that a citizen who stands in a doorway
does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" within the coverage of the fourth amend-
ment. Id. It is submitted, however, that the Santana ruling has no application in cases such
as Reed, where the arrestee was summoned from her home by a police knock.
24 The Supreme Court has taken the position that, although the fourth amendment
"protects people, not places," the nature of the place in which the intrusion occurs is never-
theless significant in measuring the citizen's expectation of privacy. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Concern for safeguarding a reasonable expectation of privacy grows
as the citizen retires from public to private places since "[tihe right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is . . .a grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance." Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). Thus, while the fourth amendment protections have
been extended to govern such non-physical intrusions as electronic survelliance, it is recog-
nized that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972).
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
28 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty involved in reconciling the princi-
ple that warrantless arrests are permissible with the general rule that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable:
It is clear, then, that the notion that the warrantless entry of a man's house in
order to arrest him on probable cause is per se legitimate is in fundamental conflict
with the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside
a man's house without warrant are per se unreasonable in the absence of some one
of a number of well defined "exigent circumstances."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971).
" See United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185, 188 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.denied, 425
U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1965); People v. Payton, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 311-12, 380 N.E.2d 224, 229-30, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400-01 (1978). See also United
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976). English common law courts consistently recog-
nized the validity of warrantless arrests. One commentator noted that the common-law rule
was so severe that "[a]ny person having 'reasonable suspicion' that another had committed
a felony could arrest him and deliver him into official custody. If necessary to effectuate such
an arrest, the person making the arrest, whether a private citizen or constable, could break
into a house to take the offender into custody." Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights,
and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46, 49; see 1 J. CHrrry, CniNAL LAw 11-71
(1816). Influenced by the common law approach, courts in the United States took a similar
view in cases involving police arrests. E.g., Grau v. Forge, 183 Ky. 521, 209 S.W. 369 (1919);
Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124 S.E. 242 (1924). See also Ex parte Rhodes, 202 Ala.
68, 79 So. 462 (1918); People v. Kilvington, 104 Cal. 86, 37 P. 799 (1894); Robinson v. State,
1979]
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addition, some argue that an entry into a home to effect an arrest
is less intrusive than is an entry for the purpose of conducting a
search.28 Others contend that a warrant requirement would unduly
hinder effective law enforcement.2 9
These arguments, however, do not appear to offer a sufficiently
cogent basis for sanctioning the invasion of privacy that necessarily
results from a rule permitting warrantless arrests in the home. At
the outset, it seems clear that, unless property interests are to be
accorded greater constitutional protection than individual rights,
the fourth amendment demands that a neutral magistrate make the
93 Ga. 77, 18 S.E. 1018 (1893).
The assumption that the fourth amendment warrant requirement does not extend to
arrest has been codified at both the federal and state levels. E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3052, 3053,
3056(a), 3061(a) (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1976); ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030 (1962); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 901.15(1)-(3) (West 1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874 (1978); N.Y. CruM. PRC. LAW §
140.10(1) (McKinney 1971). Section 120.6(1) of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure permits law enforcement officers to make warrantless arrests without regard to the arrest
site. The only limitation on this authority is contained in § 120.6(3) which prohibits warrant-
less entry into a private dwelling between 10 P.M. and 7 A.M. except where certain defined
exigencies exist. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §120 (Proposed Official Draft
1975).
11 See People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, prob.juris.
noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978). In Payton, which was decided after Reed, the
New York Court of Appeals held that warrantless felony arrests effected in the home based
on probable cause do not violate the fourth amendment in the absence of exigency. 45 N.Y.2d
at 305, 312, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 230, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396, 401; accord, State v. Perez, 277 So.
2d 778 (Fla.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973); State v. Pontier, 95 Idaho 707, 518 P.2d 969
(1974). The Payton court reasoned that warrantless arrests are permissible since a
"substantial difference" exists between the intrusion attendant to a warrantless search and
that attendant to a warrantless arrest. 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 399. While the drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, see note 27 supra,
did not wholeheartedly adopt this approach, they stated: "[Ilt is far from clear that an arrest
in one's home is so much more threatening or humiliating than a street arrest as to justify
further restrictions on the police." MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.6, at
307 (Proposed Official Draft 1975).
Numerous courts have declined to rule on the validity of warrantless in-home arrests and
thus have left standing the common law rule that an officer with probable cause may effect
an arrest in the home. See United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Fairchild, 526 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976); United States v. Hofman, 488 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Morris, 477 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 852 (1973); United States v.
Miles, 468 F.2d 482 (3rd Cir. 1972); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1972).
In People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 311, 380 N.E.2d 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d 400, the court
concluded that a concern for the suspect's privacy interest must give way to the significant
community interest in apprehending criminals and the risk of escape where police must
secure a warrant before effecting an in-home arrest. Accord, United States v. Fairchild, 526
F.2d 185, 188 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942 (1976). In addition, in
an earlier decision, the Second Circuit suggested that warrantless arrests should be permit-
ted, since people always have "the same potential mobility as do objects which are in a
moving vehicle." United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 847, 841 (2d Cir. 1965). It appears, however,
that the Second Circuit abandoned this line of reasoning in Reed.
[Vol. 53:296
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determination as to the existence of probable cause.30 That an entry
for purposes of effecting an arrest constitutes a less drastic incursion
than an entry made to conduct a search seems a particularly ques-
tionable ground for drawing a distinction. 3 Moreover, it seems clear
that a violation of constitutional rights cannot be justified solely on
the ground that the specific practice is supported by tradition or
legislative affirmation.32 Finally, a rule for arrests on private prem-
ises that parallels the rule governing searches does not seem unduly
burdensome to law enforcement officials, since it would allow the
police to forego obtaining a warrant when delay would seriously
impede their efforts.33 Such a rule would involve the use of a
' See 572 F.2d at 422; United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1109-03 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied sub nom. Stephenson v. United States, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977); Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 275,
545 P.2d 1333, 1340, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 636, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); People v.
Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 323-24, 380 N.E.2d 224, 237, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 408 (1978) (Cooke,
J., dissenting), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978). See generally
Rotenberg and Tanzer, Searching for The Person to Be Seized, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 56 (1974);
Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest, 23 STA. L. REv. 995 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Note].
1' Opponents of a bifurcated approach to searches and arrests argue that it "accords an
individual's bare possessions a greater quantum of protection than his very person, reviving
the values of an era in which property interests were exalted over personal liberties." People
v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 320, 380 N.E.2d 224, 235, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 406 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting), prob. juris. noted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1978). It also has been argued
that a search in the home involves a less drastic invasion of personal liberty than does an
arrest, since a search "cause[s] only annoyance and temporary inconvenience to the law-
abiding citizen, assuming more serious dimension only when it turns up evidence of criminal-
ity." United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). On the other
hand, an arrested individual suffers the irreversible indignity of detainment and acquires a
record that is difficult to expunge, even when he ultimately is found innocent. See Barret,
supra note 27, at 46-47.
32 In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), Justice
Marshall argued: "While we can learn from the common law, the ancient rule does not
provide a simple answer directly transferable to our system. . . . [Moreover, reliance on]
numerous state and federal statutues . . . is no substitute for reasoned analysis ....
[W]here reasoned analysis shows a practice to be constitutionally deficient, [the Court'sl
obligation is to the Constitution .... "Id. at 442-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly,
in People v. Payton, Judge Cooke noted that "neither antiquity nor legislative unanimity can
be determinative of the grave constitutional question presented here and can never be a
substitute for reasoned analysis." 45 N.Y.2d at 324, 380 N.E.2d at 238, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 409
(Cooke, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Both Justice Marshall and Judge Cooke took the
position that the fourth amendment mandates consideration of, on the one hand, whether a
warrant requirement would further a citizen's privacy interest and, on the other hand,
whether such a requirement would unduly burden legitimate law enforcement interests. 423
U.S. at 445 (Marshall, J., dissenting); 45 N.Y.2d at 322, 380 N.E.2d at 236, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
407-08 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has noted that, when faced with the question of warrantless
search, "[wie cannot be true to [the fourth amendment] and excuse the absence of a search
warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." McDonald v. United
19791
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"balancing" approach whereby the suspect's privacy interests
would be weighed against such factors as the gravity of the offense,
the likelihood that the suspect is armed and inside the premises, the
persuasiveness of the probable cause showing, the risk of escape and
the anticipated manner of entry.34 If any combination of these fac-
tors weigh heavily in favor of immediate arrest, the fourth amend-
ment's "reasonableness" requirement presumably would be satis-
fied and the need for a warrant overridden.
Arguments supporting a dual standard where the privacy of the
home is at stake seem particularly untenable in light of the close
theoretical and practical relationship that exists between arrests
and searches. An arrest is "quintessentially a seizure" of the per-
son.3' Moreover, a valid arrest may serve as the predicate for the
seizure of evidence without a warrant under the search incident to
arrest and plain-view doctrines.6 Thus, the propriety of warrantless
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); see Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35 (1970); United
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
Exceptions to the warrant requirement have been recognized in instances where "exigent
circumstances" outweighed the need for obtaining a search warrant. E.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The Court, however, has been reluctant to adopt a general "exigent
circumstances" exception in the area of searches similar to that approved in Reed for warrant-
less in-home arrests. See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). It should be noted that the rule formulated in Reed, with its reli-
ance on the balancing approach suggested in Dorman, see notes 21 & 34 supra, provides a
more flexible standard for identifying exigency than does the rule permitting warrantless
searches in only a "'few specifically established and well-delineated' situations." 399 U.S.
at 34 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 357).
11 See Haddad, supra note 5, at 520-23. The "balancing" approach to assessing the
reasonableness of a warrantless arrest was developed in Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); see note 21 supra. The Dorman criteria subsequently were en-
dorsed by the Second Circuit in United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1977), which
involved the use of a "John Doe" arrest warrant to conduct a forcible, daytime entry at the
suspect's home. Several other courts have adopted the Dorman court's view. E.g. United
States v. Killebrew, 560 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Stephenson v. United States, 429 U.S. 1064 (1977);
Salvador v. United States, 505 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d
1131 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974); Vance v. North
Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 329 N.E.2d
717 (1975). Some jurisdictions, however, have prohibited warrantless arrests effected in the
home in the absence of exigency but have not accepted the Dorman criteria as the appropriate
test for exigency. E.g., State v. Cook, 115 Ariz. 188, 564 P.2d 877 (1977); People v. Ramey,
16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); Laasch
v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 587, 267 N.W.2d 278 (1978).
" United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428-29 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); see
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1958);
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 154-57 (1927); Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448
(1806). See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
Under the "plain view" doctrine, a law enforcement officer may seize evidence that
he inadvertently discovers when he is properly on the premises. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
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in-home arrests will be determinative of the question whether evi-
dence seized in the arrest is admissible or should be suppressed as
the fruit of an illegal search. 37
It is submitted that the position taken by the Second Circuit
in Reed provides significant constitutional protections for the citi-
zen while not unduly burdening law enforcement officers in the
exercise of their duties. By requiring a showing of exigent circum-
stances before a warrantless arrest may be effected in a suspect's
home, the Reed court balanced the individual's privacy interests
against the needs of effective law enforcement in a manner consis-
tent with the demands of the fourth amendment.
John P. Furfaro
403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). Similarly, under the "search incident to arrest" principle, an officer
may make a limited search after a lawful arrest for the purpose of removing weapons and
preventing the concealment or destruction of evidence. Chimel v; California, 395 U.S. 752,
762-63 (1969); see 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE $ 41.07[l][a], at 41-66 (2d ed. 1978); W.
RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE § 562(d) (10th ed. J. Prince 1973). See generally Note, supra note 30,
at 1002.
" See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
FED. R. CiM. P. 12(b)(3), 41(e).
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